Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and by Mathias Dewatripont, Lars Peter Hansen, Stephen J. Turnovsky PDF

By Mathias Dewatripont, Lars Peter Hansen, Stephen J. Turnovsky

ISBN-10: 0511061439

ISBN-13: 9780511061431

ISBN-10: 0521818729

ISBN-13: 9780521818728

Those 3 volumes comprise edited models of papers and commentaries awarded in invited symposium periods of the 8th international Congress of the Econometric Society. The papers summarize and interpret contemporary key advancements and destiny instructions in a variety of issues in economics and econometrics. They hide conception and purposes and supply a special survey of growth within the self-discipline.

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Additional resources for Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, Volume I (Econometric Society Monographs)

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FCC auctions, bidders have used the final three digits of multimillion dollar bids to signal the market id codes of the areas they coveted, and a 1997 auction that was expected to raise $1,800 million raised less than $14 million. See Cramton and Schwartz (2001), and “Learning to Play the Game,” The Economist, May 17, 1997, p. 120. Klemperer (2002a) gives many more examples. The low prices in the ascending auction are supported by the threat that, if a bidder overbids a competitor anywhere, then the competitor will retaliate by overbidding the first bidder on markets where the first bidder has the high bids.

Hence, the equilibrium outcome of any auction cannot turn on the value of this parameter. 4)] holds cannot depend on s1B . 4), that v 3B (s1B , s2B , s3B ) − v 2B (s1B , s2B , s3B ) must be independent of s1B . Expressed differently, we have ∂ ∂ v 3B (s1B , s2B , s3B ) = v 2B (s1B , s2B , s3B ). ∂s1B ∂s1B Repeating the argument for all other pairs of buyers and for good B, we have ∂v j H ∂v k H = , ∂si H ∂si H for all j =i =k and H = A, B. 5) Next, let us fix the signal values of buyers 2 and 3 at levels such that, as we vary s1A and s1B , either (iii) it is efficient to allocate A to buyer 1 and B to 2 or (iv) it is efficient to allocate B to buyer 1 and A to 2.

See Maskin (1992). A price-minimizing auction allocates the object to the bidder with the lowest “virtual cost,” rather than to the one with the lowest actual cost. ) Compared with an ascending auction, a sealed-bid auction discriminates in favor of selling to “weaker” bidders, whose costs are drawn from higher distributions, because they bid more aggressively (closer to their actual costs) than stronger ones. But, for a given cost, a weaker bidder has a lower virtual cost than a stronger one. So, the sealed-bid auction often, but not always, yields lower prices.

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Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, Volume I (Econometric Society Monographs) by Mathias Dewatripont, Lars Peter Hansen, Stephen J. Turnovsky


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